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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
10-4762
_____________
BARRY E. SHELLEY,
Appellant
v.
GEORGE PATRICK, Superintendent; RANDALL E. BRITTON;
NANCY SMITH, Mail Inspector Supervisor;
NORENE GREENLEAF, Corrections Health Care Administrator;
PRISON HEALTH CARE ADMIN STAFF;
ERNEST OBROCK, Dentist, PHS William Civiello;
MICHELLE DRISKEL, Corrections Counselor;
MICHELLE IVICIC, Unit Manager, Management of Units;
WILLIAM CIVIELLO
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00181)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 21, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN AND GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 5, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
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PER CURIAM
Barry E. Shelley appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania that dismissed his civil rights complaint. We will
vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
Because the parties are familiar with the case, we recount only those details
necessary to understanding the present appeal. Shelley’s complaint, filed in July 2009
while he was an inmate at a state prison, 1 complained of various incidents at the prison,
including an allegation that his legal mail was opened improperly in 2006, and undated
allegations concerning the quality of health care at the prison. In August 2009, the
Magistrate Judge recommended that Shelley’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) be denied. After the Magistrate Judge denied Shelley’s motion for an extension
of time to respond to the Report and Recommendation, the District Court adopted the
Report and dismissed the case. On appeal, we found that Shelley was eligible for IFP
status; we thus vacated the District Court’s order and remanded. Shelley v. Patrick, No.
09-3947 (3d Cir. Jan. 20, 2010). In June 2010, defendant P.A. Civiello filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, as did eight individuals employed by the Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections in July 2010. On October 12, 2010, the Magistrate Judge entered an order
directing Shelley to respond to the motions to dismiss by October 30, 2010. On October
28, 2010, Shelley filed a “Motion for Enlargement of Time,” asking the Court to enlarge
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The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation in this case notes that Shelley
was released from prison shortly after he filed the complaint.
2

the time to respond to allow him “to review records to further proceeding’s [sic].”
The Magistrate Judge noted that Shelley had not responded to the motions to
dismiss over a four-month period, and had not explained why he needed more time to
respond. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed as a
sanction pursuant to Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.
1984). The Magistrate Judge also recommended that the defendants’ motions to dismiss
be granted, and found that Shelley’s complaint was meritless. Shelley did not file
objections to the Report and Recommendation. The District Court then adopted the
Report and Recommendation as the opinion of the Court, granted the defendants’
motions to dismiss, denied Shelley’s motion for an extension of time, and dismissed the
complaint. Shelley filed a timely notice of appeal.
We review a court’s decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute for abuse of
discretion. Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2008). We evaluate the court’s
exercise of discretion by examining how it balanced the factors set forth in Poulis. These
factors are: (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders; (3) a history of dilatoriness;
(4) whether the conduct of the party was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of
sanctions other than dismissal; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at
868. We examine each factor in turn.
The Magistrate Judge determined that Shelley was “completely responsible for his
failure to prosecute, does not offer any excuse, and does not even have the handicap of
3

being in prison like the last time he abandoned a lawsuit [citation omitted].” We find that
it is unclear that Shelley was “failing to prosecute” his complaint. Aside from the
Magistrate Judge’s order directing Shelley to respond to the motions to dismiss, and
giving him about eighteen days to do so, the docket does not reflect any earlier occasion
when the Court made Shelley aware of his responsibility to respond within a certain time
period. Further, Shelley responded within the time prescribed by the order, asking to be
given an extension of time to respond. It is unclear why the Magistrate Judge could not
have granted a short extension of time, especially since the other factors discussed below
do not warrant a dismissal.
As to the second factor, the Magistrate Judge commented on the “prejudice from
having to defend the civil lawsuits that follow the criminal prosecution of plaintiff,” but
did not expressly examine any prejudice that had already occurred from the delay, or that
would ensue from granting Shelley a short extension of time to respond to the motions to
dismiss. The Magistrate Judge did not separately comment on any history of dilatoriness,
but, as noted, did mention that Shelley had another case dismissed for failure to prosecute
when he was in prison. However, “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to
demonstrate a history of dilatoriness.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 261 (3d Cir.
2008) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Magistrate Judge did not examine at
all the fourth factor--whether Shelley’s failure to respond to the motions within the time
granted was willful or in bad faith. As Shelley’s first request for an extension of time
was within the period granted to respond, we find it difficult to infer that his actions
4

demonstrated bad faith or willfulness. As to the fifth factor, the Magistrate Judge found
that no financial sanction would be appropriate, since Shelley was proceeding IFP. We
agree, but, as noted, do not agree that dismissal was proper without giving Shelley a
short, final extension of time in which to respond. Finally, the Magistrate Judge found
that Shelley’s claims were meritless. As Shelley never had an opportunity to respond to
the defendants’ statements that his claims were without merit, we cannot say that this
factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. In short, it appears, at most, that only two of
the factors (Shelley’s failure to substantively respond within the time ordered, and the
lack of alternative sanctions) weighed in favor of dismissal; the other factors were, at the
most, neutral. Because “[d]ismissal is a harsh sanction which should be resorted to only
in extreme cases,” see Dyotherm Corp. v. Turbo Machine Co., 392 F.2d 146, 148-49 (3d
Cir. 1968), we hold that the Court abused its discretion here in dismissing for failure to
prosecute.
We note that the District Court also granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
We agree that Shelley’s complaint, as it stands, does not “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ---U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). However, we decline to affirm the dismissal on
that basis, as Shelley was not given the opportunity to amend his complaint following the
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filing of the defendants’ motions to dismiss. 2 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (“When a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend a deficient
complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, the court must inform the plaintiff that he
has leave to amend within a set period of time, unless amendment would be inequitable
or futile.”) (emphasis omitted). 3
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for
further proceedings.
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We recognize that the Magistrate Judge’s August 14, 2009 Report and
Recommendation, which recommended denying Shelley’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, gave the parties notice that they could file objections within ten days, and
advised Shelley that he could “amend his in forma pauperis motion to show why he is not
able and will not be able to pay the filing fees, and he may amend his complaints to state
a claim, file objections without amending his complaints, or both file objections and
amended complaints,” presumably also within the ten days. Docket # 5, at 5-6. Shelley
filed a motion for extension of time within the ten days, explaining that he had not yet
received “doctor reports and other documents.” Docket #6, at 2. The Magistrate Judge
denied his motion for extension of time without explanation. The District Court then
entered the order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny IFP status.
Because Shelley’s motion for extension of time was denied, we do not believe that this
was a fair opportunity to amend the complaint.
3

We do agree, however, that Shelley’s allegation of interference with his legal mail
was time-barred. Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000) (for § 1983 actions
originating in Pennsylvania, Court applies two-year statute of limitations applicable to
personal injury actions set forth in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524).
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